Thomas V. Morris, UNDERSTANDING IDENTITY STATEMENTS by Quinn, Philip L.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 3 Issue 4 Article 9 
10-1-1986 
Morris, UNDERSTANDING IDENTITY STATEMENTS 
Philip L. Quinn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Quinn, Philip L. (1986) "Morris, UNDERSTANDING IDENTITY STATEMENTS," Faith and Philosophy: Journal 
of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 3 : Iss. 4 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol3/iss4/9 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
468 Faith and Philosophy 
philosophical presuppositions which are unexamined and unjustified. The best 
response philosophers can make to Brown's excellent and learned book is to 
take up his invitation to a dialogue with biblical critics. In that dialogue philos-
ophers will undoubtedly have a great deal to learn; but they also will have much 
to teach, and what they have to teach should make a significant difference to 
biblical scholarship. 
Understanding Identity Statements, by Thomas V. Morris. Aberdeen: Aberdeen 
University Press, 1984. Pp. xv and 152. $23.75, (paper $16.25). 
Reviewed by PHILIP L. QUINN, University of Notre Dame. 
This book, theJifth in the series of Scots Philosophical Monographs, discusses 
the analysis of identity statements in its first five chapters and the epistemic 
assessment of identity statements in its last four chapters. Identity statements 
are statements which can be expressed in English by such sentences as the 
following: 
and 
(1) Phosphorus is Phosphorus 
(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus 
(3) That pain is that neural event 
(4) Jesus of Nazareth is God the Son. 
What is it that identity statements state? Under what conditions are identity 
statements warrantedly assertable? The chapters devoted to the analysis of identity 
statements are intended to propose an answer to the first question, and those 
which concern the assessment of identity statements return an answer to the 
second. In this brief review, I shall give sketches of both answers, indicate why 
I find the first answer unsatisfactory, and discuss the application Morris makes 
of the second answer to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. 
Morris prepares the ground for his own analysis of identity statements by 
trying to undermine two of its prominent rivals; they are the objectual analysis 
and the metalinguistic analysis. According to the objectual analysis, identity 
statements state that a certain reflexive relation, self-identity, holds of a single 
object. Hence, on this analysis, (1) and (2) are standardly used to make the same 
identity statement. But this renders the proposed analysis very counterintuitive. 
Because it appears that (1) and (2) differ in informational content and epistemic 
status, it seems that they are used to make different identity statements. According 
to the metalinguistic analysis, identity statements state that two actually referring 
BOOK REVIEWS 469 
expressions of one or two semantic types refer to the same thing. But this proposal 
too has counterintuitive consequences. It seems clear that one can have a prop-
ositional attitude such as belief directed toward the statement expressed by (2) 
without having any beliefs about the English names 'Phosphorus' and 'Hesperus'. 
As Morris amiably admits, these counterintuitive consequences do not amount 
to conclusive disproofs of the two analyses. But he concludes that they do render 
both problematic enough to justify his efforts to formulate a third alternative. 
Morris characterizes his own proposal as a functional analysis. Its stated 
purpose is "to account for the informative import of identity statements as they 
are used in ordinary language by offering an account of them in terms of their 
cognitive function" (p. 55). That function is to collate or connect different bits 
and bodies of information about the world. Morris explicates this idea with the 
aid of a couple of 'pictures' or 'models' borrowed from Strawson. Here is a 
simplified sketch of one of them. If ancient astronomers had kept all their 
information about the evening star in a file labeled 'Hesperus' and all their 
information about the morning star in a separate file labeled 'Phosphorus', then 
the identity statement expressed by (2) would function for them to warrant 
merging those two files, once they came to know it. 
I find pictures of this kind helpful in thinking about some of the epistemic 
functions of the statement expressed by (2). But I doubt that a description of 
these epistemic functions of that statement tells us what it is that it states. Morris 
carefully does not claim, and it is surely counterintuitive to suppose, that the 
statement expressed by (2) actually states something about collating information, 
merging files, or the like. But what, then, does it state? As far as I can tell, 
Morris gives no answer to this question. So I doubt that his functional account 
is an analysis in the same sense as and, hence, is a genuine rival of the objectual 
and metalinguistic analyses. 
Morris makes an explicit attempt to ward off this sort of criticism by endorsing 
a doctrine, inspired by Wittgenstein, about the relation between function and 
meaning. Speaking of identity statements, he says: 
It is the informational or epistemic function of these statements which 
is the key to their proper analysis. When we have explicated this, we 
have given an account of their meaning (pp. 69-70). 
But, even if it be granted that epistemic function is the key to analysis, it does 
not follow that an account of epistemic function is the same as (identical to) an 
analysis of meaning. Moreover, even if it turns out that a justification-theoretic 
semantics provides the best analysis of the statement expressed by (2), it seems 
plausible to suppose that such an analysis will involve the justification-conditions 
for that statement and not just an account of its role in justifying other things 
such as information collation. And, finally, the way in which Morris applies his 
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own analysis to sentences like (1) appears to create a rather severe problem for 
his view. At one point (p. 80), he says that the analysis implies that such sentences 
do not express statements or propositions at all, or at least that there is no reason 
to think so. But, if this really is a consequence of the functional analysis, as it 
may well be, it renders that analysis every bit as counterintuitive and, hence, 
problematic as its objectual and metalinguistic competitors. 
Morris begins the second part of the book with a discussion of various principles 
which go by the name 'Leibniz's Law'; they are the indiscernibility of identicals, 
the identity of indiscernibles, and the principle of substitutivity. He construes 
such principles as spelling out conditions for the warranted assertibility of identity 
statements. They function as principles of epistemic assessment. Insofar as Leib-
niz's Law is relevant to the epistemic grounding of ordinary identity statements, 
Morris supposes it can be adequately expressed by saying that two expressions 
are co-referential just in case any predicate in logical form which yields a true 
statement when attached to one also yields a true statement when attached to 
the other. 
As is well known, Leibniz's Law spells trouble for cross-category identity 
statements such as those standardly expressed by (3) and (4). It seems that they 
cannot pass the test it poses for co-referentiality. Pains can be throbbing; neural 
events cannot. God the Son is omnipresent; the man Jesus of Nazareth is not. 
So it appears that such deviant identity statements cannot be warrantedly assert-
able; indeed, they seem to be necessarily false, if not meaningless. 
Morris examines in detail a response to this problem which would weaken 
Leibniz's Law for the special case of identity statements which bridge logically 
distinct modes of discourse. He argues that the objections to this response are 
sufficiently numerous and weighty to render it unacceptable. So he is left with 
only three alternatives. Either the identity statements expressed by (3) and (4) 
are merely metaphorical, or they are necessarily false, as they appear to be, or, 
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, their pairs of referring expressions 
do satisfy Leibniz's Law. 
How, then, are we to assess the identity statement expressed by (4)? There 
have been those who call themselves Christians who have opted for the first and 
second alternatives. In his final chapter, Morris takes the more orthodox stand 
of defending the third. The argument is skeptical. We know very little about 
which properties are essential to humans; perhaps possibly being conscious at 
some time is the only property we know a priori to be essential to humans. 
Though we may know that God the Son is essentially omnipresent, we do not 
know that the man Jesus of Nazareth is essentially non-omnipresent. Indeed, we 
know of no essential human property which is not co-exemplifiable with the full 
set of essential divine properties. Hence, we do not know that the two referring 
expressions in (4) must fail to satisfy Leibniz' sLaw, and so we do not know 
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that the identity statement expressed by (4) is necessarily false or is not warran-
tedly assertable. 
I am sympathetic to the view that we do not know very much about which 
are the essential human properties. I am even inclined to agree with Morris when 
he suggests (pp. 135-36) that it is methodologically permissible, and perhaps 
even obligatory, for Christian philosophers to use what faith teaches about the 
Incarnation as a control on their theorizing about human nature. But I do not 
believe that our knowledge of essential human properties is quite so meager as 
it would have to be in order to render the position Morris defends unproblematic, 
and so I think Leibniz's Law still spells trouble for the statement expressed by 
(4). It seems to me that we do know, on the basis of broadly scientific consid-
erations, that being an organism is a property essential to each human. And it 
also seems to me that we know that God, being by nature Pure Spirit, has 
essentially the property of being a non-organism. Of course I could be wrong 
about one or both of these things. And I do not mean to assert that each human 
is exactly the same sort of organism whenever he or she exists; our present 
bodies may differ in biological detail from our glorified bodies after the General 
Resurrection. But I think I have the appearances with me in suggesting that the 
little we do know about human nature suffices to show that the two referring 
expressions in (4) do not pass the test for co-referentiality posed by the formulation 
of Leibniz's Law Morris has endorsed. 
Though I found much to disagree with in Understanding Identity Statements, 
my criticisms are meant as a compliment to the book's power to provoke philo-
sophical thought. It deals with important philosophical problems in a novel and 
stimulating way. It is written in a style which is clear, concise, and refreshingly 
free of superfluous technicalities. And it sets forth a theoretical position which 
merits careful consideration by all Christian philosophers. 
Being Human ... Becoming Human, by Helmut Thielicke. Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 475 pages. $17.95. 
Reviewed by T. WILLIAM HALL. 
Upon reading Helmut Thielicke's Being Human ... Becoming Human one is 
quickly reminded of Paul Tillich's The Courage fa Be, Ernest Becker's The 
Denial of Death, and Soren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling in that all focus 
on the limits and possibilities of being human. They are similar, too, in that all 
draw upon depth psychologies, on philosophical insights, on literary images, 
and all deal with moral issues. Thielicke's book stands apart from the others in 
the explicit and constant use of classical Christian theology as his criterion of 
